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Afghanistan aid conference pledges $16bn over four years

Hamid Karzai urges international community not to abandon his country after most foreign troops withdraw in 2014

guardian.co.uk,

Sunday 8 July 2012 09.38 BST

The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, at the Afghanistan aid conference in Tokyo. Photograph: Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

 

International donors have pledged $16bn (£10bn) in badly needed development aid for Afghanistan over the next four years as the president, Hamid Karzai, urged the international community not to abandon his country.

 

The donors' conference in Tokyo, attended by about 70 countries and organisations, is aimed at setting aid levels for the crucial period until and beyond 2014, when most Nato-led foreign combat troops will leave and the war-hit country will assume responsibility for most of its own security.

 

"I request Afghanistan's friends and partners to reassure the Afghan people that you will be with us," Karzai said in his opening statement.

 

The Japanese foreign minister and officials travelling with the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, said the donors had made $16bn available by 2015, which would be in line with the nearly $4bn a year the Japanese co-hosts had said they were hoping to achieve during the one-day conference.

 

Japan, the second-largest donor, says it will provide up to $3bn by 2016, and Germany has announced it will keep its contribution to rebuilding and development at its current level of $536m a year at least until 2016.

 

The donors are also expected to set up monitoring measures to ensure the aid is used for development and not wasted by corruption or mismanagement, which has been a major hurdle in putting aid projects into practice. "We have to face harsh realities filled with difficulties,'" said Japan's prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda.

 

Afghanistan has received nearly $60bn in civilian aid since 2002. The World Bank says foreign aid comprises nearly the equivalent of the country's gross domestic product.

 

Foreign aid in the decade since the US invasion in 2001 has led to better education and healthcare, with nearly 8 million children, including 3 million girls, enrolled in schools. That compares with 1 million children more than a decade ago, when girls were banned from school under the Taliban.

 

Improved health facilities have halved child mortality and expanded basic health services to nearly 60% of Afghanistan's population of more than 25 million, compared with less than 10% in 2001.

 

But the flow of aid is expected to diminish sharply after international troops withdraw, despite the ongoing threat the country faces from the Taliban and other militants.

 

Along with security issues, donors have become wary of widespread corruption and poor project governance. Before the conference, Japanese officials said they were seeking a mechanism to regularly review how the aid money was spent, and guarantees from Kabul that it would not be squandered.

 

The US portion is expected to be between $1bn and $2.3bn – this year's figure – every year for the next decade. Officials declined to outline the future annual US amounts, but the Obama administration has requested a similarly high figure for next year as it draws down American troops and hands over greater authority to Afghan forces.

 

The total amount of international civilian support represents a slight trailing off from the current annual level of about $5bn, a number somewhat inflated by US efforts to give a short-term boost to civilian reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, mirroring Barack Obama's decision in 2009 to ramp up military numbers in the hope of routing the Taliban insurgency.

 

The aid will come with conditions: the pledges are expected to establish a road map of accountability to ensure that Afghanistan does more to improve governance and finance management, and to safeguard the democratic process, rule of law and human rights – especially those of women.

 

Karzai vowed to "fight corruption with strong resolve". But he still faces international weariness with the war and frustration over his failure to crack down on corruption.

 

Clinton, who briefly visited the Afghan capital on Saturday before heading to Tokyo, had breakfast with Karzai and acknowledged that corruption was a "major problem".

 

The $4bn in annual civilian aid comes on top of $4.1bn in yearly assistance pledged last May at a Nato conference in Chicago to fund the Afghan National Security Forces from 2015 to 2017.

 

Source: guardian.co.uk

 

oldmarine 

How Many Civilians Are Killed by U.S. Drones?

by Micah Zenko
June 4, 2012

After last week’s excellent reporting in Newsweek and the New York Times, many pundits and policymakers are newly aware of America’s policy of targeted killings and the existence of “kill lists.”

This recent surge in interest and awareness in targeted killings is a particularly sad commentary on the lack of interest in foreign affairs—or at least where U.S. bombs are currently falling—since George W. Bush first authorized targeted killings on September 17, 2001.

The first such killing outside of a combat zone took place in Yemen on November 3, 2002, and the existence of multiple kill lists across the U.S. government has been known—albeit with important information gaps—for years.

Even if some have just learned of America’s escalating use of lethal force against suspected terrorists or militants a decade after the program began, any public interest and debate is welcomed.

The passage from the New York Times that received the most attention describes that, according to the Obama administration’s methodology, there are inherently few civilian casualties as a result of the “signature strikes” against unnamed people:

It in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.

 

Counterterrorism officials insist this approach is one of simple logic: people in an area of known terrorist activity, or found with a top Qaeda operative, are probably up to no good.

This is not a new story. President Obama simply expanded on a policy initiated by his predecessor, but with more drones at his disposal (there were thirty-four drone combat air patrols [CAPs] when he came into office, now there are fifty-seven) and an even longer list of targets.

As a former senior counterterrorism official remarked this weekend regarding signature strikes in Yemen, the “elasticity” of what the Obama administration considers a “direct threat” to the United States “has grown over time.”

Another former senior official clarified, “There was a little liberalization that went on in the kill lists that allowed us to go after” Yemeni militants opposing the regime in Sana’a, rather than specifically the United States.

The use of signature drone strikes was first revealed in a February 22, 2008, New York Times article by Eric Schmitt and David Sanger. The journalists reported President Bush’s decision to authorize:

A significant relaxation of the rules under which American forces could aim attacks at suspected Qaeda and Taliban fighters…Instead of having to confirm the identity of a suspected militant leader before attacking, this shift allowed American operators to strike convoys of vehicles that bear the characteristics of Qaeda or Taliban leaders on the run, for instance, so long as the risk of civilian casualties is judged to be low.

It is impossible to know with any certainty how many civilians—or noncombatants—have been killed by such attacks due to their “covert” nature, lack of timely access to remote villages, and the inherent biases of the U.S. government, targeted terrorist organizations, and host governments.

Estimates by nongovernmental experts vary widely: in April 2009, Pakistani terrorism researcher Amir Mir claimed that civilians constituted 98.14 percent of all deaths from CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, while Georgetown University professor Christine Fair stated, “Actually the drones are not killing innocent civilians.”

Estimates from anonymous Obama administration officials about many civilian casualties provide little clarity. In April 2009, a U.S. official claimed that “more than 400” enemy fighters in Pakistan had been killed by drone strikes: “We believe the number of civilian casualties is just over 20, and those were people who were either at the side of major terrorists or were at facilities used by terrorists.”

In addition, in May 2010 a U.S. counterterrorism official stated: “We believe the number of noncombatant casualties is under 30, those being people who were near terrorist targets, while the total for militants taken off the battlefield exceeds 500.” In August 2011, ABC News reported, “[A senior U.S. official] said that while the U.S. agrees around 2,000 suspected militants have been killed, the total civilian casualties are closer to 50.”

If the number of civilian casualties increased by ten, while the amount of suspected militants killed increased by only one hundred, it is implausible that only twenty additional civilians were killed while the next 1,500 militants lost their lives.

In Afghanistan, where American and international forces enjoy significantly greater intelligence and situational awareness from villagers on the ground and surveillance aircraft overhead than in Pakistan, Predator drones have mistakenly killed civilians on several occasions, including twenty-three deaths in a February 2010 incident—as well as U.S. Marine Staff Sgt. Jeremy D. Smith and Naval reservist Benjamin D. Rast in April 2011, the first U.S. servicemembers killed by an American drone.

In June 2011, White House senior counterterrorism adviser John Brennan affirmed: “There hasn’t been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities we’ve been able to develop.” 

Brennan later provided a statement to the Times that “adjusted the wording of his earlier comment,” according to the article: “Fortunately, for more than a year, due to our discretion and precision, the U.S. government has not found credible evidence of collateral deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan or Iraq, and we will continue to do our best to keep it that way.”

Brennan did not explain what is considered “credible evidence,” but that same week an anonymous U.S. official echoed his assertion, declaring, “We can’t confirm any noncombatant casualties.”

In April 2012, when asked to clarify his assessment of civilian casualties, Brennan replied: “What I said was that over a period of time before my public remarks that we had no information about a single civilian, a noncombatant being killed.”

He did acknowledge that “Unfortunately, in war, there are casualties, including among the civilian population,” and “sometimes you have to take life to save lives.” In one fell swoop, the standard for counting civilian casualties slid from “credible evidence” to “no information.”

During roughly the same time period, several research organizations estimated the following civilian deaths from CIA drone strikes in Pakistan alone (such assessments exclude civilians killed in Yemen from U.S. attacks):

• New America Foundation: 66;
• Long Wars Journal: 44;
• University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth: 24; and
•  Bureau of Investigative Journalism: 200 (approximately).

Given that there is plenty of information—with varying degrees of credibility—about civilians killed in U.S. counterterrorism operations, it is safe to assume that Brennan has either ignored such research or purposefully misled the American public.

In response to the Newsweek and Times reporting last week, the White House spokesperson said, “I am not going to get into the specifics of the process” and “I don’t have the assessments of civilian casualties…we make great efforts to reduce the risk of civilian casualties.” 

That same day, the Pentagon spokesperson told reporters, “Specifics I can’t get into…I can assure you that the number of civilian casualties is very, very low,” and “we’re very confident that the number is very low.” In other words, the Obama administration is maintaining its “trust us” position on targeted killings, without providing any supporting evidence to reinforce that trust.

In March, after Army Staff Sgt. Robert Bales allegedly massacred sixteen men and women in southern Afghanistan, President Obama gave a heartfelt statement about the tragedy: “The United States takes this as seriously as if it was our own citizens and our own children who were murdered. We’re heartbroken over the loss of innocent life.

The killing of innocent civilians is outrageous and it’s unacceptable. It’s not who we are as a country.” This sentiment should extend beyond civilians killed by U.S. ground forces to those that result from highly precise airstrikes.

Of course, the targeted killings policy initiated by President Bush and expanded by President Obama differs from a horrific and willful massacre of innocents. There is reportedly an exhaustive interagency process with multiple levels of review by officials and staff that attempts to minimize the number of civilian casualties from U.S. counterterrorism operations.

However, if the methodology for determining targets includes not only those who appear on vetted kill lists, but also anonymous individuals nearby, then citizens should be deeply skeptical of any numerical estimates or soothing adjectives provided by the Obama administration.

Source: blogs.cfr.org

oldmarine

When the Boomers Went to South Korea

There are not many public pictures showing the U.S. ballistic missile submarine visits to South Korea. This one apparently shows the USS John Marshall (SSBN-611) in Chinhae in 1979. The submarine carried 16 Polaris A3 missiles with a total of 48 200-kt warheads.

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By Hans M. Kristensen

 

Back in the late-1970s, U.S. nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines suddenly started conducting port visits to South Korea. For a few years the boomers arrived at a steady rate, almost every month, sometimes 2-3 visits per month. Then, in 1981, the visits stopped and the boomers haven’t been back since.

 

At the time the visits began, the United States also had several hundred nuclear weapons deployed on land in South Korea, but the submarine visits apparently were needed to further demonstrate that the United States was prepared to defend the south against an attack from the north.

 

After North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, shelling of South Korean territory and the sinking of one of its warships, there have been reports recently that an increasing number of South Koreans want the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea again, after the last such weapons were withdrawn in 1991. They think it is necessary to deter North Korea.

 

Some analysts have even suggested that the United States should develop an improved nuclear earth penetrator to better threaten North Korean deeply buried targets, an idea that was previously proposed the Bush administration but rejected by Congress.

 

Boomers in Chinhae

The SSBN visits to South Korea are unique; the United States normally does not send SSBNs into foreign ports. But there are exceptions.

 

In 1963, the USS Sam Houston (SSBN-609) sailed into Izmir in Turkey on a mission to assure the Turkish government that the United States still had the nuclear capability to defend Turkey even after Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from bases in Turkey following the Cuban missile crisis. The Izmir visit was a one-time event, however, and no SSBN visited foreign ports for the next 12 years.

 

Between December 1976 and March 1981, nine U.S. ballistic missile submarines conducted 35 port visits to South Korea

Then, on December 19, 1976, the USS Sam Houston suddenly arrived in Chinhae, South Korea.

 

The ship was under order to “surface in Korea for 3 days to ‘rattle the saber,” according to a former crew member. This was the first foreign port visit of a U.S. SSBN in the Pacific.

 

Two visits followed in 1978 but in 1979 the operations expanded with 14 visits conducted by eight SSBNs. In October that year, three SSBNs made three visits for a combined presence of 15 days.

 

The following year, in 1980, the number of visits expanded to 15, in June with three visits for a combined 17 days in port. In 1981, coinciding with the phase-out of the Polaris SLBM, the visits dropped to only two.

 

The Political Context

The 35 port visits conducted by nine SSBNs to Chinhae were a powerful message to South Korea and its potential adversaries about the U.S. nuclear capabilities in the area. But exactly what the reasons for the visits were remain unclear.

 

The visits took place in a complex political situation. South Korea had started a program to develop nuclear weapons technology, President Carter wanted to withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, and North Korea was building up its military forces backed by China and the Soviet Union.

 

Ironically, South Korea had started a nuclear weapons technology program in 1974 not because of doubts about the U.S. nuclear umbrella per ce, but because of doubts about the reliability of the overall U.S. security commitment. The program reportedly was terminated in 1976 after U.S. and French pressure. [See here for an insightful analysis]

 

At the same time, newly elected president Jimmy Carter to withdraw U.S. nuclear weapons from bases in South Korea. At the time the SSBN visits began, the U.S. had approximately 500 ground-launched nuclear weapons at bases in South Korea – roughly the same number of warheads as onboard the missiles of the nine visiting SSBNs.

 

In the end, Carter’s withdrawal didn’t happen but the land-based weapons were significantly reduced (see below).

During the time of the SSBN visits, the number of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea was reduced from roughly 500 to 150. The last were withdrawn in 1991.

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The SSBN visits might also have been designed to remind China about the U.S. military presence in the region, despite its defeat in Vietnam.

 

The end of the SSBN visits to South Korea in 1981 and the phase-out of the Polaris SSBNs fleet in the Pacific coincided with China’s removal from the U.S. strategic war plan as part of the Reagan administration’s efforts to recruit China as a partner against the Soviet Union. (China was later reinstated in the war plan in 1997 by the Clinton administration.)

 

In September 1982, the first new Ohio-class SSBN deployed on its first patrol in the Pacific and over the next five years it was followed by seven other boats, each loaded with 24 longer-range and more accurate Trident I C-4 missiles. (All have since been upgraded to the even more capable Trident II D-5 missile). None of the Trident SSBNs have ever visited South Korea, even after the withdrawal of the last land-based nuclear weapons from the country in 1991.

 

Implications

The SSBN visits to South Korea are a curious but little noticed footnote in the Cold War history. More research is needed to better describe exactly why they happened, but the visits seemed intended to signal assurance to South Korea and deterrence to its adversaries.

 

As such the visits have potential implications for today. North Korea has since crossed the nuclear threshold, support seems to be growing in South Korea for returning U.S. nuclear weapons to the peninsula, and some argue that better nuclear capabilities are needed to deter Pyongyang.

 

But the visits are a reminder of the already considerable nuclear capabilities in the region that could be used to signal. Nuclear-capable bombers routinely forward deploy to Guam, and the eight SSBNs patrolling in the Pacific could surface again and visit South Korea if necessary.

Nearly 30,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, large-scale conventional exercises such as the three-carrier battlegroup Valiant Shield (image) and the half-a-million-man Ulchi Freedom Guardian, as well as forward operations of nuclear-capable forces in the region provide a powerful deterrent.

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The question is whether it is necessary. The nuclear capabilities the United States operates in the Pacific region today are far more capable than in the 1970s, and the combined conventional forces of South Korea and the United States enjoy a significant advantage over North Korea’s aging conventional forces.

 

To the extent that anything can, these forces should be sufficient to deter large-scale North Korean attacks against the south.

 

Indeed, Pyongyang’s obsession with the U.S. nuclear capabilities – even its misperception that Washington still deploys nuclear weapons in South Korea – strongly suggests that the current nuclear umbrella has Pyongyang’s full attention and that nuclear redeployment or nuclear bunker busters are not needed.

 

After all, the objective is to move forward toward a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, not return to the past.

 

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

 

Source: fas.org

 

oldmarine